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The risk and cost of a bearing restoration by grinding program was
analyzed. A microeconomic impact analysis was performed. The annual
cost savings to U. S. Army aviation is approximately $950, 000. 00 for
three engines and three transmissions. The capital value over an indefi-
nite life is approximately ten million dollars. The annual cost savings
for U. S. Air Force engines is approximately $ 313, 000. 00 with a capital
value of approximately 3. 1 million dollars. The program will result in
the government obtaining bearings at lower costs at equivalent reliability.
The bearing industry can recover lost profits during a period of reduced
demand and higher costs.
INTRODUCTION
Roller and ball bearing fatigue failures account for approximately
ten percent of all bearing failures. The remaining 90 percent may be
attributed to a variety of causes related to manufacturing flaws, human
error or the effects of dirt and corrosion. Unlike fatigue failures, the
other causes of failure are not subject to a tractable analytical proce-
dure for failure prediction (ref. 1).
Those bearings removed for reasons other than fatigue failure
consist primarily of component failures which affect the integrity of
the bearing and consequently the integrity of the aircraft. In order to
minimize risk, a subjective judgment is made to remove the bearing
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2and replace it. The usual procedure is to remove bearings during
overhaul or other work on engines or transmissions, clean and visually
inspect them for defects and dimensional conformance to print. Since
most bearings are not disassembled during this operation, if there is
any doubt regarding integrity, the bearing is replaced.
A pilot program, was undertaken by the AVSCOM and NASA in con-
junction with Industrial Tectonics, Inc. to establish the restorable yield
of bearings which would be candidates for restoration by grinding (refs. 1
and 2). Using statistics obtained from the Corpus Christi Army Depot
for a three month period in 1972 for the UH-1 helicopter, out of 4212
rolling-element bearings which were removed and discarded at overhaul
for a calendar quarter it was probable that 90 percent or 3792 could be
recovered through restoration by grinding. Extrapolating these statis-
tics, it was further speculated that approximately one-half million dollars
a year could be saved by Army aviation through bearing restoration by
grinding (ref. 2). Assuming for purposes of discussion that a 90 percent
recovery can be accomplished, the risk and cost of such a procedure
must be analyzed.
In addition to the above, consideration should be given to the micro-
economic impact of bearing restoration upon the bearing market. In
the event that there is little impact upon the market, and little or no risk
of using restored bearings :, then a bearing restoration program would
offer the government a significant cost savings over replacement of new
bearings. If any of the areas produce adverse consequences, restoration
still cannot be rejected, but the analysis to determine overall value be-
comes considerably more complicated. In this paper, an attempt will
be made to determine overall value, risks and costs associated with a
bearing restoration program.
PROCEDURE
The bearing restoration procedure is nearly the same procedure
as the manufacturing of new bearings except that much of the work has
already been performed. The process constitutes approximately the
3last 30 percent of the total operations required to make a new bearing.
Of considerable significance is the fact that this portion of the process
is the least capital intensive since most of the forming has been done
and material replacement is confined to ball or roller elements. One
manufacturer's process (ref. 2) consists of a grinding operation on the
outer diameter, bore, land, face, and race. Bores and OD's are ground
and either thin nickel or chrome plated to restore them to original print
dimensions or salvage dimensions. Inner and outer raceways are re-
ground to a depth of 0.002 in. per surface. Since the race radii are
each approximately 0.002 in. larger, the bearing must be refitted with
balls 0.004 in. larger in diameter (ref. 2). The effective race curva-
ture is identical to original dimensions within significant mathematical
values. Although the bearing contains oversized balls and raceway curva-
tures, the geometry of the bearing is unchanged and so the stress level
and estimated life will be identical to the original bearing. A similar
restoration procedure applies to roller bearings (ref. 2).
The restored bearing contains new rolling elements such
as balls or rollers. An advantage of regrinding the raceways is that
any incipient spalls or cracks will be uncovered; in such cases the part
will be scrapped.
The final aspect of the procedure is that it requires an economic
lot size production run because of the set-up cost which is about $ 500.
Although some manufacturers consider the minimum economic lot size
to be about 500 bearings, the set up cost per bearing will go from $1 to
$5 if only 100 bearings are restored in a single lot. For $50 OED/!
bearings, the $5 per bearing set-up cost may be enough to render res-
toration uneconomical, but for a $900 OEM bearing, the charge may
not be significant. At this point an assumption will be made: it is
assumed that each bearing federal stock number will constitute one
potential production lot. That is, the geometry and other characteristics
of a bearing are uniquely specified by a federal stock number. As a
result, it is not possible to combine various bearing types to produce
an economic lot size.
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In order to conduct a restoration program, it would be necessary
to establish several inventory policy changes. Additionally, it would be
necessary to conduct annual analyses and reviews to ensure that bearing
types selected for the program are being used in sufficient quantity to
maintain qualification for the program. Further, consideration should
be continually given to qualify other bearing types should price or quan-
tity changes warrant their inclusion in the program. The review and
analysis should be conducted by a central authority where complete rec-
ords of bearing consumption are available.
The review and analysis ideally should be a two stage process; the
first stage would consist of a rough screening review and the second, a
detailed cost review.
The rough screening review should consist of two criteria; these
being price and quantity. The simplest criteria are: if the bearing cost
exceeds $ 50 OEM price and annual replacement is greater than 100
bearings, the bearing passes the rough screening to become a candidate
for a detailed analysis. Another useful criterion would be: if the demand-
price product exceeds $ 5000 per year, the bearing should be a candidate
for a detailed analysis.
For the bearings passing the rough screening, the detailed analysis
would require the following information for each bearing:
Federal Stock Number
Annual requirements for replacement
Technical Data
Bearing Drawing
Use
Restoration tolerances
This information should then be sent to potential vendors with a
request for quotation of prices which should include
Unit price for 60 percent return
Unit price for 70 percent return
Unit price for 80 percent return
Unit price for 90 percent return
._	 .u__ -
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The RFQ should stipulate that the quotes include a guarantee that the
manufacturer will restore a specified fraction of the rejected bearings
-`	 or incur a penalty. An example of such a penalty v, here the fraction
restored is less than the guaranteed return is,
(1.25)x(Guwranteed fraction return minus actual fraction return)x
(number of bearings shipped to vendor)x(Prevailing scrap price)
In this case, the vendor is required to pay scrap value plus 25 percent
for the difference between his guaranteed rate of restoration and the ven-
dor's actual performance. Also, the vendor will be required to pay the
prevailing scrap price on (1 - Guaranteed Fraction) of the bearings
shipped to the vendor. Moreover, the unit price per bearing paid by the
government would be equal to the lowest unit price of the quoted guaran-
teed returns. After quotations are returned, the optimal replacement
policy can be determined by selecting the minimum cost for each bearing
type using the expression
For a given i
MIN TC (i, j, GFijk)
such that
TC (i V GFijk) = Ni (GFijk x UPijk) - ( 1 - GFijk)(SVi)
+ (1 + GFijk)(SCij ) + (1 - GFijk)(OEMPi)
+ (1 - GFijk)(OEMPSCi)
where
i	 bearing type
j	 vendor
k	 guaranteed fraction index (0, 6, 0. 7, 0. 8, 0.9)
TC(i, j, GF ijk ) total cost of replacement for bearing type i, using
vendor j with a guaranteed return rate k
6Ni	number of bearings of type i to be shipped to vendor
GFijk	 guaranteed fraction return of type i from vendor j with
return in0ex k (k = GFijk)
UPijk
	
quoted price of restoring one unit of i from vendor j with
guaranteed fraction k
SVi	prevailing salvage value of bearing type i
SCij	one way shipping cost
OEMPi
	original equipment vendor unit price for bearing type i
OEMPSCi
 shipping cost for one new bearing type i
This optimization procedure will yield the minimum cost policy for
each bearing type. A sensitivity analysis should also be performed by
varying the fraction returned and including the penalty function to deter-
mine the sensitivity of not meeting the vendor expected performance. In
the event that the vendor exceeds promised performance, there should
be no extra incentive because the vendor will be benefiting directly since
the vendor is paid for each unit and the government will benefit from a
lower than expected total cost.
COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS
A partial listing of annual bearing demand was obtained from the
Army Aviation Systems Command. This listing included current prices
and annual demand for the following
ENGINE TRANSMISSION
T53 UH-1
T55 CH-47
T63 OH-58
Data on certain prices in effect in 1972 were also available. Table I
is a comparison of these costs. Although the sample is very small and
probably not statistically adequate, the information provided is worthy of
t
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special note. During the period 1972 to 1976, the U.S. economy was
subjected to a rather severe case of demand -pull inflation. The results
of such inflation are that general price levels rise because the demand
for goods and services exceeds the supply available at existing prices
(ref. 3). Another consequence is that there are long delays for indus-
trial and commercial deliveries and large backlogs in manufacturing
plants. The backlogs may still be present in the bearing industry for
some bearing types, but the large price increases are conspicuous by
their absence. Reference will be made to this point again.
An analysis was conducted using the annual demand data from
"SCOM. The data are only for the three Army engines and trans-
mission:. cited above. 'fables 2 and 3 show the stock numbers, annual
demand, OEM price and estimated restoration price for all bearings in
the data set which pass the rough screen test criterion of demand - OEM
price product > $ 5000 per year. Table 4 is a comparison of cost dif -
ferences between OEM replacement and a 0.90 fraction (90 percent)
programs. The total cost savings of the 0.90 restoration program is
approximately $ 950, 000 for one year for the three engines and three
transmissions in the data set. If OEM demand cost for bearings is rel-
atively stable despite fluctuations in actual demand for specific types,
then a relatively constant savings can be accomplished through bearing
restoration. This value will be approximately one million dollars per
year. The capital value over an indefinite life of such a program is
approximately ten million dollars for the three engines and three trans-
missions included in this analysis.
A similar analysis was performed using data supplied by the U. S.
Air Force MATP in Oklahoma City. These data appear in tables 5 and 6.
The annual cost savings of bearing restoration for the Air Force engines
would amount to approximately $313, 000. 00. The capital value over
an indefinite life of such a program is approximately 3. 1 million dollars.
8RISK AND UNCERTAINTY
In the previous section, cost quotes by a single bearing manufacturer
were used to compare the cost-effectiveness of restoration with the pur-
chase of new bearings. The prices are sufficiently conservative whereby
it would not be generally expected that these prices would be exceeded
in a competetive procurement. Therefore, the cost savings associated
with the price quotations would generally be more than may be actually
achieved.
The major risk and uncertainty associated with the process is the
reliability of restored bearings and the yield of production runs. It was
assumed that a 90 percent yield could be achieved. Therefore, the cost-
effectiveness analysis was performed using a 0.90 fractional yield. This
basic assumption is supported by the inspection of 529 bearings comprising
three bearing types from the UH-1 helicopter (refs. 1 and 2). The inspec-
tion results indicated a potential yield rate which exceeded 90 percent
which supports the assumption used herein. Additional inspection data
should be obtained in order to establish the confidence of the yield rate
for other bearings and bearing applications,
Based upon the endurance testing reported in reference 1 for the
three bearing types discussed above, the reliability of the restored bear-
ings appears to be very similar to that of new bearings. On the basis
of these results the risk and uncertainty associated with the reliability
of restored bearings are no greater than those associated with new bear-
ings. Further testing of restored bearings from other vendors should
be conducted to establish the confidence of this conclusion for other res-
toration by grinding methods.
If one examines the failure rate as a function of time, experience
should be similar to the graph in figure 1. The population will initially
exhibit a high failure rate if it contains some proportion of substandard,
weak specimens (ref. 4). As these components fail, the failure rate de-
creases rapidly during the burn-in or debugging period and stabilizes to
an approximately constant value. During the useful life period, the failure
rate is at its lowest level. When the components reach the life Two
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wearout becomes noticeable and from that time, the failure rate in-
creases rapidly. The work of reference 1 indicates that such a "bathtub
function" may be applicable to restored bearings.
It is noteworthy that the only two failures which occurred out of the
90 bearings tested were attributed to the new rolling elements. These
would have also failed in new bearings. The reliability of the bearing
itself may be greater than that of new bearings because of the probable
elimination of infant mortality of the restored bearing raceways. Such
a terl ative conclusion should be reinforced with additional testing of other
restored bearings.
MICROECONOMICS OF BEARING INDUSTRY
The effect of implementing a bearing restoration program will
primarily be a doubling of the useful life of approximately 90 percent of
engine and transmission bearings in the program. An obvious question
is what effect such a program will have upon the bearing industry. To
answer such a question, it is necessary to delve into the microeconomics
of the bearing industry. A key to answering the question lies in the be-
havior of prices over the period of the last several years.
From 1972 to 1976, the economics of the west were plagued with
double digit demand-pull inflation. Increases in aggregate demand
caused rapid price increases as the industrial sector approached maxi-
mum production levels. However, as noted previously in the small
sample comparison, prices of bearings increased an average 2 percent
annually. Several factors could account for such anomolous stability.
If demand for bearings was lower than capacity, this situation might pos-
sibly dampen price increases because of competition and because there
would be little need for capital expansion.
During this period (1972-1576) there was a gradual withdrawal
from Vietnam. Therefore a decreased demand for bearings is plausible.
Over a period of a couple of years, if costs were stable and demand de-
creased, there would be increased competition and a tendency to reduce
profits for the sake of optimizing production costs. Such a conclusion
i
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results from an examination of total production costs as a function of
production rate. The elements of total cost are the total fixed costs of
a facility and the total variable costs. Fixed costs are incurred from
expenses for depreciation, taxes, utilities, and other indirect expenses.
Variable costs are incurred from labor and materials. Total costs (TC),
total variable costs (TVC) and total fixed costs (TFC) are depicted as a
function of production rate (units per time unit) in figure 2.
In addition to these costs there is average cost (AC) which is total
cost divided by the production rate. Average variable cost (AVC) is the
total variable cost divided by the production rate; average fixed cost (AFC)
is the total fixed cost divided by the production rate. If the rate of pro-
duction is increased and fixed cost is a constant, then the AFC will de-
crease. The TVC has a tendency to increase rapidly as production is
started, but will tend to level off to some extent as the optimal plant
capacity is approached. When this point is exceeded, it will be necessary
to add labor in the form of overtime or additional personnel and material
costs will have a tendency to increase. The net effect is that there will
be a point of inflection in the TVC function. Up to this point, AFC and
AVC have been decreasing. Thus, the marginal cost (MC), which is the
incremental cost of increasing the production rate by one unit, has also
been decreasing.
Up to this point, the MC has been decreasing at a more rapid rate
than AC and so it is economical to increase production. However, as
MC begins to increase, there will be a point at which MC and AC are
equal. It will not be economical to produce beyond this point over a
long period because this will have a tendency to raise long run average
costs. Simultaneously, production rates below the MC equal AC point
will have a tendency to also increase long run average costs. Since it
is desirable to operate near this point where AC equal MC, it may often
pay to absorb some increased costs rather than to tolerate a decreased
production rate. This is because these increases will have a tendency
to increase the optimal production rate which will further increase the
difference between the market demand rate and the optimal production
rate.
11
If there is a marked reduction of demand in an industry, the impli-
cations of the preceding discussion are that a manufacturer will have a
tendency to decrease prices and forgo some profits in order to main-
tkin a production rate which minimizes the average unit cost. But, during
the period of hypothesized demand decrease, prices for nearly all other
things were increasing rapidly. During such a period the reduced mar-
ket industries will have to pass through some price increases, but
these increases are most likely to lag the economy as a whole.
The net effect of decreased demand is depicted in figure 3 for the
time points T 1, T2 , T3, and T4 . The slope of the price line reflects
a tendency for prices to increase over time. When demand slackens
at T2 , the industry will reduce prices to some extent until demand is
stabilized at T 4 . If prices were increasing dramatically in the over-
all economy and demand for a particular item slackened, the net effects
would be to damper the rate of price increase for the item in question.
As the industry demand stabilized, there would then be a tendency to
increase prices rapidly until some lost profits were recaptured. But
production rate is still down from previous levels and so the price must
be increased over what would have been if the dernand had not slackened
(T 5). Gradually prices will stabilize at T 6, which is a level necessary
to maintain previous profits.
This scenario seems to be what has happened in the bearing Indus; ry
with the present time line corresponding to something between T 4 and
T5 in figure 3 if one deflates bearing prices at the same rate as for
the overall economy from 1972 to 1976. If no other economic changes
occur in the bearings industry economy, there should be a round of price
increases coming for the industry in late 1976 or 1977. These increases
may be mitigated to some extent by the lack of a need for capital %mpan-
sion. As depreciation costs decrease in a depressed market, profits can
be maintained to some extent.
If a bearing restoration program were implemented, the effects
would be to reduce demand. This reduction could possibly coincide with
he predicted price increases for late 1976 or early 1977. The net effect
vill be to dampen the magnitude of the increases. But eventually, the
ncreases will come.
12
The total effect seen by the Army Aviation will be a net reduction
in bearing expenses because of the extended life of the restored bearings.
To predict within an acceptable range of uncertainty, however, would
require an extensive data gathering task and a more comprehensive
analysis than was presented herein.
GENERAL COMMENTS
A process of bearing restoration by grinding has been compared
wit ►, , ew replacement of rejected bearings for three engines and three
transmissions used in military helicopters. The cost advantages of
using s e ,^, ared bearings is very significar ` compared to use of new
bears. ,, F-.. The risk and uncertainty associated with using restored bear-
ings appear to be no greater than with the use of new bearings.
A cursory analysis of the microeconomics of the bearing industry
established a tentative hypothesis that the industry is being squeezed
because of reduced demand and higher costs. The implication is that
the industry might well be expected to raise prices in the near future.
The effect of a bearing refurbishment program would be a softening of
the price increases because there is equivalent profit in bearing restora-
tion as in new bearing manufacturing. The advantage to manufacturers
is the recovery of lost profits, which is essential for the maintenance of
^a
a healthy industry. The advantages of bearing restoration to the govern-
ment are lower costf and equivalent reliability.
H. Hanau performed an analysis of the raw material savings associ-
ated with bearing restoration (ref. 2). The analysis predicts significant
savings of critical alloying elements. The advantages to the United
States are that less raw material would be used. The savings are genu-
ine because the raw material has intrinsic value. Moreover, there is
ar. energy utilization associated with the transformation of this raw
material to the finished bearing. The value of the savings is the value
of the material and energy conserved.
i4
t
13
SUMMARY OF RESULTS
A pilot program was undertaken by AVSCOM and NASA in conjunc-
tion with Industrial Tectonics, Inc. to establish the restorable yield of
bearings which would be candidates for restoration by grinding. Assum-
ing a. 90 percent bearing recovery rate can be accomplished, the risks
and costs of such a procedure were analyzed. A macroeconomic impact
analysis of bearing restoration upon the bearing market was performed.
The following results were obtained.
1. The annual cost savings to Army Aviation is approximately
$950,000.00 for three engines and three transmissions. The capital
value over an indefinite life of such a program is approximately ten
million dollars.
2. Based upon U. S. Air Force logistic data, the annual cost savings
of bearing restoration for Air Force engines would amount to approxi-
mately $313, 000. 00. The capital value over an indefinite life of such a
program is approximately 3. 1 million dollars.
3. The advantage of bearing restoration to the government are lower
bearing costs at equivalent reliability. The advantage to the bearing
industry is the recover; of lost profits during a period of reduced demand
and higher costs.
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APPENDIX - TABLE OF SYMBOLS
AC average cost
AFC average fixed cost
AVC average variable cost
GFijk guaranteed fraction restoration of type	 from j with
index k
i bearing type
j manufacture
k guaranteed fraction index
N.
z
^-^^.mber of bearings of type i
MC marginal cost
OEMP original equipment manufacture price
OEMPSC shipping cost of a new bearing
SC one way shipping cost
SV salvage value
TC total cost
TFC total fixed cost
TVC total variable cost
UP unit price
15
TABLE 1. - COMPARISON OF UH-1 TRANSMISSION BEARING
COSTS DURING 1972 AND EARLY 1976
Federal stock number	 1972 price,	 1976 price,
	
Annual rate of
$	 $	 price increase,
3110-00-133-3378 56.98 69.07 5
3110-00-133-3379 219.00 233.00 1.5
3110-00-135-2603 334.00 365.00 2.2
3110-00-199-7398 50.83 50.83 0
TABLE 2. - 1975 U.S. ARMY AVIATION ENGINE BEARING
DEMAND AND PRICES
Federal stock number Annual demand OEM price, Restoration price,
T53 engine
3110-00-727-3032 516 64.65 38.00
3110-00-995-8007 108 60.46 35.00
3110-00-071-4568 552 90.20 43.00
3110-00-421-1814 315 51.18 30.00
T55 engine
3020-00-986-0441 684 53.56 32.00
3020-00-986-0443 972 77.18 41.00
2840-00-986-0444 1416 75.48 40.00
3110-00-116-5534 96 389.00 152.00
3110-00-106-5798 48 136.00 70.00
T63 engine
3110-00-426-1195 840 58.30 35.00
3110-00-199-7398 1488 50.83 30.00
3110-00-133-3379 564 233.00 100.00
3110-00-135-2603 636 365.00 130.00
3110-00-133-3378 504 69.07 32.00
^	 t
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TABLE 3. - 1975 U. S. ARMY AVIATION TRANSMISSION
BEARING DEMAND AND PRICES
Federal stock number Annual demand OEM price, Restoration price,
OH-58 transmission
3110-00-426-1210 144 153.00 77.00
3110-00-400-2786 264 359.00 130.00
3110-00-179-7297 170 108.00 50.00
3110-00-179-7299 96 82.10 42.00
3110-00-132-1049 336 61.53 36.00
CH-47 transmission
3110-00-060-7965 10 853.00 330.00
3110-00-856-6608 29 660.00 260.00
3110-00-155-4212 72 135.00 70.00
3110-00-051-5627 144 824.00 300.00
3110-00-057-8306 33 337.00 132.00
3110-00-828-5174 72 331.00 130.00
3110-00-984-0276 96 641.00 250.00
3110-00-060-7911 84 101.00 50.00
3110-00-913-4203 42 142.00 73.00
3110-00-836-0451 64 500.00 205.00
3110-00-833-9082 72 105.00 48.00
3110-00-014-2055 35 351.00 138.00
3110-00-946-0546 24 265.00 104.00
3110-00-946-4876 25 351.00 138.00
3110-00-067-8289 60 84.51 43.00
3110-00-052-0392 20 268.00 115.00
3110-00-066-5286 48 305.00 120.00
3110-00-052-0393 24 255.00 100.00
UH-1 transmission
3110-00-199-7398 1488 50.83 30.00
3110-00-133-3379 564 233.00 100.00
3110-00-135-2603 636 365.00 130.00
3110-00-133-3378 504 69.07 32.00
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TABLE 4. - ARMY OEM VS. 90% RESTORATION FOR 1975
OEM repl, cost, Restoration cost,
T53 engine
T55 engine
T63 engine
OH-58 transmission
CH-47 transmission
UH-1 transmission
Total
Difference
105 801.18
262 405,68
522 970, 32
163 723.68
361 643.60
473 998.32
61 543.62
149 045,70
258 650.37
79 309.02
165 039.06
227 293,17
.•
1 890 542.78	 940 880,94
949 661.84
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TABLE 5. - ENGINE BEARING DEMAND AND PRICES
FOR 1976 FOR U.S. AIR FORCE
Federal stock number
T F33 3110-00-868-2741RU
3110-00-830-1694RU
3110-00-007-6910RV
3110-00-858-2683RV
3110-00-103-7248RV
3110-00-858-2659RV
3110-00-868-2742RV
3110-00-864-9269RV
3110-00-864-9404RV
TF30 3110-00-182-8078PQ
3110-00-274-9830PQ
3110-00-412-0498PQ
3110-00-881-481OPQ
3110-00-412-3449PQ
OEM price, Annual demand Restoration price,
151.00 40 77,00
444.20 24 173.00
163.92 72 84.00
394.50 60 154.00
222.50 68 108,00
660,30 72 258,00
210.90 68 97,00
446.20 64 174.00
210.30 80 96.00
427.93 136 167.00
493.62 176 193.00
1093.96 200 427.00
253.20 84 116.00
352.27 64 137.00
Source: Letter dated 3 May 76: E. L. Ansley, Chief of Production Branch
U.S. Air Force MATP, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma..
f	 '^
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TABLE 6. - AIR FORCE OEM VS. 90% RESTORATION FOR 1976
OEM replacement cost, . 90 restoration cost/. 10 OEM
$	 replacement,
TF33 engine	 174 566.64	 83 556.26
TF30 engine
	
407 671 . 68	 185 299.97
Total	 582 238.32	 268 856.23
Difference	 $ 313 382.09
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